

## Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

*courage is contagious*

## Viewing cable 05ANKARA353, AFGHANISTAN: TURKEY CONSIDERING UK REQUEST TO TAKE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cable's unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#05ANKARA353**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
05ANKARA353	2005-01-19 15:31	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Ankara

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3996309.ece>

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000353  
SIPDIS  
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2030  
TAGS: [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [TU](#) [AF](#) [UK](#)  
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: TURKEY CONSIDERING UK REQUEST TO TAKE  
OVER PRT IN NORTH

Classified By: DCM Robert S. Deutsch for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

**1.** (U) This is an action request -- see para 7.

**2.** (C) Summary: Turkey is positively considering a request by HMG to assume responsibility for the UK PRT in Mazar-e Sharif to help free up resources for the UK to lead a PRT in ISAF's Stage 3 expansion region, according to the Turkish MFA and confirmed by the British Embassy in Ankara. Ankara has not yet responded to London, preferring first to hear Washington's view after exploring the subject with the British. Turkey will not consider leading a PRT in ISAF stage 2 or stage 3 areas. Instead, the GOT will abandon the idea of leading a PRT if this proposal doesn't work. We understand from USNATO that some Nordics have already stepped up to take over Mazar. If this is true and we and the HMG no longer need or want the Turks to lead an existing PRT in the north, we recommend telling the GOT this as soon as possible. End summary.

**3.** (C) Following up on Foreign Minister Gul's remark to CENTCOM Commander GEN Abizaid January 11 that Turkey was again considering leading a PRT in Afghanistan (septel), on Jan. 18 PolMilCouns called on MFA South Asia DDG Aydin Evirgen. Evirgen confirmed that Turkey was again looking at leading a PRT in the north. "We have no intention to go into Stage 2 or 3," he said, due to "logistic and security problems." The British had approached the GOT several times over the past several months about the possibility of Turkey taking over one of its PRTs in the north -- either Meymaneh or Mazar-e Sharif, most recently during TGS Chief GEN Ozkok's visit to London. (The British Embassy later confirmed that the British Chief of Defense raised the possibility with Ozkok on Jan. 10.) This would free up resources for the British to take over the US PRT in Kandahar, Evirgen said. The Norwegian Embassy had informed the Turks that Oslo was interested in taking Meymaneh. After consultations between

MFA and TGS, Turkey would take Mazar sometime after the Turks relinquish command of ISAF VII "if offered," Evirgen declared.

14. (C) In discussing the meaning of "if offered," Evirgen explained that after last year's experience of offering PRTs in certain locations only to have them rejected by SHAPE and the US, Ankara wanted Washington and London to discuss the possibility first. If the USG, HMG and SACEUR agreed that this arrangement was desired, then the GOT would express its willingness at NATO. He said that Turkey had not indicated its willingness to take over the PRT in Mazar to the UK; Ankara preferred the British hear it from the US. (We have alerted the British Embassy here to this.) In any event, a decision would be needed in the next few weeks for Turkey to be ready to assume the Mazar PRT shortly after the end of ISAF VII.

15. (C) PolMilCouns raised the question of Turkey's historic ties to Afghan warlord Dostum. Evirgen said that he understood sensitivities about this had factored into rejecting Turkey's original proposal to establish a PRT in Meymaneh. He thought these concerns were unfounded at that time, and argued that the situation in Afghanistan had evolved so this should not be a factor any longer. In any event, the GOT was advising Dostum and others in Afghanistan that "the time of the warlords is over; only political leaders will count now." He said Turkey had encouraged Dostum to support the political and DDR processes.

16. (C) Evirgen said that NATO was currently looking at establishing stage 2 PRTs in Baghdis and Goh. PolMilCouns recalled Turkey's willingness to cover Baghdis from Meymaneh when Ankara proposed having a PRT there and asked whether Ankara would consider establishing a new PRT there. Evirgen responded that the conditions there were very tough and while Turkey had been willing to visit Baghdis periodically from Meymaneh, it would not consider a PRT outside of the north. He thought that the suggestion to take over a British PRT would be Ankara's last offer on PRTs.

17. (C) Action request: The Turks are clearly a bit reluctant to move forward on this due to their previous experience of the alliance's rejection of their previous PRT offers. If this is a nonstarter, either because London has already lined up others to assume control of their PRTs or for other reasons, we should let the Turks know as soon as possible. We request Washington consult with HMG and provide guidance on how we should proceed.

18. (U) Kabul minimize considered.  
EDELMAN